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When the votes are counted, pundits have spoken and it is clear how many seats the parties have 
won, the negotiations about forming a government begin. The Head of State, or in the case of 
Sweden the Speaker of the Parliament, takes advice from the party leaders and based on this 
decides who should be asked to form a government. All of the Scandinavian countries enjoy negative 
parliamentarism (see Bergman, 1995), where no investiture vote is necessary, and only when a 
majority against the government is shown is the government obliged to resign. The scholarship on 
cabinet formation is vast and much too broad to cover in this chapter. However, when discussing the 
making and breaking of governments (see Laver and Shepsle, 1996) in this chapter it is possible to 
limit the theoretical discussion of government formation to a very simple proposition. For all the 
Scandinavian countries cabinets come in two forms; majority or minority, both can be composed of 
either a single party or of more than one party through a coalition. 
 Where there is a formation of a government there must also be a termination, or turnover, 
of a government. Defining the type of cabinet is an easy matter, but more debate has been 
forthcoming about how cabinet termination and cabinet change must be defined (for an overview 
see Lijphart, 1999). Generally, the consensus is that a government is terminated or changed when a) 
there is an election, b) the Prime Minister changes, c) the partisan composition of the cabinet 
changes, or d) a voluntary or involuntary resignation by the government is accepted by the Head of 
State (Browne et al, 1984; 1986). This definition is both sufficiently broad to cover all aspects and 
sufficiently detailed to allow for categorisation, and as Michael Laver (2003: 23) aptly puts it “…no 
graduate student will be taken out and shot for using this definition…”.  
There are limitations to this definition, a situation where the Prime Minister stays the same, 
but all other cabinet posts change, will be counted as the same government despite a radically 
different make-up of cabinet personnel. Contrary, a government that wins an election and continues 
unchanged will be seen as a different government to the one before the election as the bargaining 
environment has changed with the election. This definition allows us to examine more in detail why 
cabinets terminate. Majority governments are more stable, more fractionalised party systems have 
more government terminations, where there is greater support for extreme opposition parties there 
are more terminations, and lastly, the higher the number of attempts needed for forming the 
government the more unstable the government (Laver, 2003).  
Changes within the cabinet, ministerial turnover or more popularly termed reshuffles, are a 
matter for the Prime Minister and if in a coalition the party leaders of the governing parties. While 
changing ministers is not without risk for the Prime Minister (Hansen et al., 2013: 229), it does 
happen and the international literature suggests a wide range of reasons for this. It might be due to 
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policy failure or scandal that can be pinned on one particular minister or a general goal of increasing 
the government popularity among the electorate (Dewan and Dowding, 2005). Intra-party rivals may 
need to be stopped or placated, or new talent and competence is required for the survival of the 
government (Huber and Martinez-Gallardo, 2008; Kam and Indridason, 2005). In a study of 
ministerial turnover in Norway, Sweden and Denmark it was found that the saliency of the 
ministerial portfolios matter for turnover, but that this effect is moderated by government 
popularity (Hansen et al., 2013). It should be noted here that in the Scandinavian parliamentary 
democracies the Prime Minister has the formal power to hire and fire cabinet ministers with the only 
limitation being the ability to maintain the confidence of the parliament. Under coalition 
governments the hiring and firing and of ministers might be decentralised informally to the 
participating party leaders, although the formal power is vested with the Prime Minister. 
 In the next sections of the chapter each of the five Scandinavian countries will be discussed 
in relation to cabinet formation, cabinet type, cabinet stability and ministerial turnover, before a 
concluding section drawing out the similarities and differences between the countries. 
 
Sweden 
Swedish governments are formed under an unusual form of negative parliamentarism. Since 1975 
the monarch (Head of State) plays no role in the government formation procedure, this role is taken 
on by the Speaker of the Parliament who presents a Prime Minister candidate for the Parliament to 
vote on. Before the new government can be formed it must be shown that an absolute majority 
backs the candidate, i.e. not more than half of the MPs must vote against the candidate. This 
element was also introduced in 1975 alongside the role of the Speaker in the government formation 
process (Bergman, 2000: 202). The role played by the Speaker is in reality relatively small and 
equivalent to that of the Head of State in the other Nordic countries, the parties bargain internally 
and once it is clear that a candidate can form a government with an absolute majority behind it the 
Speaker will name that person as his or her candidate.  
Historically Sweden has seen a large proportion of single-party minority governments, all but 
one led by the Social Democrats, though since 2005 coalition governments have been the norm. 
When the centre-right parties form a government this has since 1979 been exclusively coalition 
governments. The last single-party centre-right government was the short-lived liberal government, 
led by Ola Ullsten, which was only in office for little more than a year 1978-1979. After the 2014 
election the Social Democrats formed a minority coalition government, the first Social Democratic 
coalition since Tage Erlander’s coalition with the Centre Party in the 1950s, the 2014 government 
under Stefan Löfven is also the first government where the Greens take part. The 2014 government 
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came about after an election that produced no majority for either the incumbent centre-right 
government or the Social Democratic opposition and the right-wing Swedish Democrats holding the 
balance of power. This resulted in the ‘December agreement’ in December 2014 where six of the 
eight parties in the Swedish Parliament agreed that the leader of the largest block should become 
Prime Minister and that minority governments would get their budgets through, this was done to 
keep the Swedish Democrats from having any parliamentary influence. However, in October 2015 
the Christian Democrats decided to leave the agreement and was swiftly followed in their exit by the 
three other centre-right parties. At the time of writing the breakdown of the agreement have not 
had any influence on the position of the Swedish Democrats in the Swedish Parliament, for all intent 
and purposes their seats are not used by the opposition to place the government in a minority nor 
are they sought out by the government to help bring its policies through. 
Swedish governments are for the most part stable. This is undoubtedly due to the fixed four-
year interval between elections.1 While the possibility of an early exists it is in effect a very limited 
power, as the Prime Minister cannot call an early election within three months of the last election 
and it cannot happen after the government have resigned and serves as a caretaker government 
(Bergman 2000: 204). The Speaker can also call early elections is four successive prime ministerial 
candidates are voted down by more than half the MPs, however, in all cases the new elections are 
only held for the period until the next fixed time comes up (Bergman, 2003: 603), and this 
significantly diminishes the return of holding an early election, which is undoubtedly a reason why 
this is not used as a Prime Ministerial tool more often, while it is possible de jure to call early 
elections in Sweden, it is de facto not the case.  
Before the constitutional reform of 1970 the risk of government turnover was higher due to 
the need for a majority in both chambers of the bicameral legislature, with the change to a 
unicameral legislature this element disappeared (Bergman, 2000: 201). The office of Prime Minister 
has also seen much stability, Tage Erlander formed ten governments and served from 1946-1969, 
before Olof Palme took over. Swedish politics in the 1970s were, like Danish politics, quite 
challenging for the duration and stability of governments. From 1976-1982 saw four governments 
formed and terminated over the six years. Only four times has the post of Prime Minister changed 
outside of elections, twice due to the death of the incumbent; Per Albin Hansson passed away in 
1946 and Olof Palme was murdered in 1986, once due to the retirement of the party leader, Ingvar 
Carlsson in 1996, and once when the coalition led by Torbjörn Fälldin broke down in 1978 and was 
replaced without an election by the liberal single-party government led by Ola Ullsten.  
                                                          
1 This changed from three year intervals to four year intervals in 1994. 
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 Ministerial turnover outside of elections and outside of the entire government resigning is 
relatively small in the Swedish cases, Hansen et al (2013) reports 63 cases from 1967-2008, which is 
nearly 40% below the corresponding number for Norway and Denmark. This might be due to the 
fixed electoral periods and the use of junior ministers, which are excluded from the 63 cases. 
However, like in other countries there are examples of ministers serving a very short period of time 
and resigning or being fired due to scandal or ill-health. Most notably Maria Borelius from the 
Conservatives who were appointed Minister of Trade in 2006, but resigned after eight days due to a 
scandal about her not reporting the labour she was using for child care, and hence not paying the 
correct social fees. The Social Democrat Börje Andersson resigned as Minister of Defence in 1982 
after two months on the post due to home sickness, while Social Democrat Sture Henriksson became 
Minister of Communication in 1957 but committed suicide one month after his appointment. Long-
serving ministers are also found in Sweden, with Tage Erlander being the most well-known example 
with 23 years as Prime Minister and two years of previous cabinet experience, but also Gunnar 
Sträng who served for more than 21 years as Minister of Finance (1955-1976) deserves a mentioning 




Danish governments are formed after the party leaders provide their advice to the Queen on who 
should form the government and what type the government should be. The Queen will appoint the 
person with the most seats behind him/her as a Royal Examiner to examine the possibilities for 
forming a government under the instructions given by the party leaders. This process can take 
anywhere from a day to several weeks, and several rounds examiners might be needed. Once it is 
clear that there is no outright majority against one person and that person has the most support 
among the parties, he or she will be asked to form the government and become Prime Minister.  
 Since 1945 Denmark have primarily had minority governments, with majority governments 
(all coalitions) only present from 1957-60, 1968-71 and, depending on how the situation of some 
party defectors are judged, also 1993-94. Single-party governments had until 2015 not been known 
since the resignation of the Social Democratic government in 1982, but after the 2015 election the 
Liberals formed a single-party government with only 34 seats of the 179 possible, this is still a much 
more comfortable situation since last time the Liberals attempted government alone, where they for 
just over twelve months from 1973-75 formed a government with only 22 parliamentary seats. 
 In comparison to other Scandinavian countries, Danish governments are less stable. This is 
first and foremost due to the Prime Minister having the right to call early elections and this right has 
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been used extensively. Erik Damgaard (2000: 253-258) demonstrates that Danish Prime Ministers in 
the vast majority of cases make use of this right and dissolve parliament before the four-year 
electoral period is over. Government turnover without an election has only happened twice; the 
Social Democrats left office in September 1982 after a long and arduous fight to right the economy, 
the Conservative led coalition who took over managed to stay in power until 1993 when they 
themselves turned over power without elections to the Social Democrats due to a scandal regarding 
the Ministry of Justice’s handling of Tamil (from Sri Lanka) refugee cases. Government change where 
a coalition partner left the government and it continued without the partner has been equally 
limited; the Centre Democrats left the Social Democratic led coalition in 1996 and most recently the 
Socialist People’s Party left another Social Democratic led government in 2014, both cases did not 
result in a new election. New elections are also not called when a Prime Minister resigns between 
elections or passes away. The latter happened twice in the 1950s, Hans Hedtoft and H.C.Hansen 
both died in office, whereas Viggo Kampmann, Jens-Otto Krag and Anders Fogh Rasmussen all 
resigned without an election and were replaced as Prime Ministers by a member of their own party. 
 While the Danish governments are less stable than their Scandinavian counterparts the 
internal turnover of ministers is very much aligned with the Norwegian rate, while Sweden is much 
lower (Hansen et al., 2013: 238-239). This is both with respect to general turnover, i.e. where the 
government changes, but also turnover within the period. Generally, Danish Prime Ministers tend to 
turnover their ministers for the well-established reasons; new blood and new ideas. Yet, there are 
also numerous examples of long-serving ministers who have successfully changed ministerial posts, 
but stayed in government for longer periods; the Liberal Bertel Haarder was first appointed a 
minister in 1982 and left with the government in 1993. He was re-appointed under a new Liberal 
government in 2001 and served until its demise in 2011. After the 2015 election he was once again 
made a cabinet minister. These examples are rare, more often occurring are the removal of 
ministers for various reasons. Health reasons play a less important role than it used to, but scandals 
and party internal issues are more prevalent leading to direct firings of ministers. A noted example 
of this befell the Centre Democrat Bente Juncker in 1994 who served two weeks before being fired 
over derogatory statements made about mentally disabled people living near her vacation house. An 
example of internal party issues becoming an issue for ministerial turnover happened when the 
Socialist People’s Party changed party leader in October 2012. This meant that two of their ministers 
were fired by the new party leader to make room for herself and another colleague. While the 
changes in Danish governments are the prerogative of the Prime Minister there is a norm that each 







The prerogative of selecting who should form the government used to lie with the Finnish President 
after taking advise from the party leaders. This used to be extremely important for the fragmented 
Finnish party system that the President could select the candidate for the post of prime minister and 
provide the instructions under which the government was to be formed. However, since 2000 it is 
the Parliament that elects the Prime Minister who is then officially appointed by the President.  
Generally government formation through coalition building in Finland can take some time to be 
complete, not least due to less clear party alliances. This has also had an impact on the type of 
governments Finland has seen. The Finnish Presidency has also undergone changes which mean that 
it today is a less powerful office than it was during most of the latter half of the 20th Century. The 
main reason for this was a move under President Urho Kekkonen who from 1956-1982 moved the 
Finnish presidency towards a very activist role and expanded his authority to domestic politics 
(Nousiainen, 2001: 101). The Finnish presidency was always important when it came to foreign 
policy. The geographical location of Finland which saw it neighbouring the Soviet Union meant that 
Finnish foreign policy had to balance the wishes of the Soviet Union with that of a democratic 
nation. This approach was termed ‘Finlandization’ which was a policy that by many was seen as 
subservient to the Soviet Union (Karvonen, 2014: 34-35) and meant that President Kekkonen used 
his powers to secure governments that were not questioning this element of policy. When Mauno 
Koivisto became President in 1982 a gradual normalization towards the Soviet Union began 
coinciding with reforms within the Soviet Union itself. President Koivisto also turned out to be a less 
activist president than his predecessor and the presidency returned to its more traditional pre-
Kekkonen style (Nousiainen, 2001: 101). 
For many years Finland saw primarily over-sized coalitions and one explanation given was 
that a number of laws required a two-thirds majority to pass, e.g. taxation (Nousiainen, 2000: 269), 
which meant the governments not enjoying this majority were limited in what policies they could 
pass. However, this does not hold when taking into account that his requirement was abolished in 
1991 and yet, since 1983 Finland has only had oversized coalitions, and where they did exist in 
earlier times, they were often replaced with single-party or caretaker governments (Karvonen, 2014: 
78-79). Though an explanation traditionally given more precedence is the wish to avoid bloc 
coalitions, although in recent years this might have diminished somewhat. In relation to the other 
countries examined in this chapter Finland is the country with most instability when it comes to 
governments, although as Nousiainen (2000: 273) remarks there appears to have been a shift in the 
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stability from the early 1980s onwards towards much more stable cabinets. Karvonen (2014: 103) 
goes as far as to argue that the change of President from Urho Kekkonen to Mauno Koivisto in 1982 
can be seen as an important event for the durability of Finnish cabinets which is notably longer post-
1982 than it was under before and under Kekkonen. 
 Since 1945 Finland has seen 38 cabinets, of which seven have been caretaker cabinets 
formed when the President decided that government formation was problematic and new elections 
would not yield a better outcome. The caretaker cabinets have been a mixture of partisan and non-
partisan, though Finland has not required such a cabinet since 1975. The election periods are for 
four years and have been so since 1956, since 1991 it has become very difficult to call early elections 
(Karvonen, 2014: 101); though no early election has been called since 1975. The high number of 
cabinets is also a function of the tendency of governments to change very little, but according to the 
definitions discussed earlier in this chapter requiring the counting as new governments. Take for 
instance the electoral period 1975-1979 which saw five governments; a caretaker government 
followed by a Centre Party led coalition with four other parties, a Centre Party led coalition with two 
of the previous governing parties having left the previous coalition, a Social Democratic led coalition 
consisting of the same parties as the first Centre Party led coalition, and finally another Social 
Democratic led coalition with one of the parties of the previous government leaving the new one. 
This complexity does result in a large number of cabinets, although it must also be pointed out that 
in recent years more stability has been present. Though the record for the shortest cabinet is from 
recently, where Anneli Jäätteenmäki from the Centre Party only survived 68 days a Prime Minister 
after the 2003 election where it was found that she had lied about how she obtained confidential 
documents from the Foreign Ministry and had used them in her election campaign. However, the 
coalition which was formed after the 2003 election continued just with a different Prime Minister. 
 The large turnover of governments, especially in the earlier periods covered in this chapter 
also means that there is less scope from ministerial turnover outside of an entire party leaving the 
government. Despite the often turnover ministers have had long tenure when combining their 
service. Johannes Virolainen served nearly 17 years between 1951 and 1979, and Paavo Matti 
Väyrynen served over 16 years between 1975 and 2011. On the shorter tenures, death and illness 
are obvious explanations for some short tenure, Swedish People’s Party minister Henrik Kullberg 
served for 17 days in Sakari Tuomioja’s caretaker government before his passing. Paavo Rantanen, 
who was appointed as a non-partisan Foreign Minister in 1995 after his predecessor Heikki Haavisto 
had to resign due to ill health, only served for two months until the election in 1995 where Esko 







The Norwegian Constitution places the responsibility for appointing cabinet ministers with the King. 
In practice the King asks each party leader for advice and once it is clear that one party leader is 
preferred the King will ask him or her to form the government. The process is usually very short and 
rarely takes more than one round (Narud and Strøm, 2000: 172). Norwegian governments require no 
vote of investiture and the government is assumed to have the confidence of the parliament until 
otherwise proven. The government can even suffer defeats in parliament and only if the lost motion 
has been designated a motion of no confidence must the government resign (though see Rasch, 
1987). 
For a long time coalition governments in Norway were the prerogative of the centre-right 
parties, and except for Per Borten’s government in the 1960s, they rarely survived an election. Up 
until the 2005 election the Social Democrats had never taken part in a coalition government and 
Jens Stoltenberg was the first Social Democratic Prime Minister to lead such a government. Only one 
non-social democrat single-party government has seen the light of day in Norway, a single-party 
Conservative government from 1981-83, which was replaced by coalition government led by the 
same Conservative Prime Minister, Kaare Willoch. Coalition governments in Norway have so far been 
equally split between majority and minority ones, whereas single-party governments have seen a 
slight overweight of minority governments. Hanne Marthe Narud and Kaare Strøm (2000: 159) 
reported that coalition governments had become less likely, which was undoubtedly true at the 
time, but from 2001 onwards Norway has seen nothing but coalition governments.  
The Norwegian Prime Minister cannot call an early election, which means that if the 
government experiences a vote of no-confidence a new government will have to be formed without 
an election being called. This was for instance the case when the Conservative led Willoch 
government could not secure a majority for its budget in 1986 (Narud and Strøm, 2000: 186). The 
lack of early elections means that many Norwegian governments last the entire four years. However, 
there have also been some examples of governments being formed and lasting only a short period of 
time, not least the first centre-right coalition led by the Conservative John Lyng in 1963 which only 
lasted 24 days and was defeated on its government declaration, incidentally John Lyng only formed a 
government after the Labour party was forced to resign mid-term. A similar situation happened in 
1972 when Social Democrat Prime Minister Trygve Bratteli chose to resign and Christian Democrat 
Lars Korvald was given the chance to form another coalition, which lasted a few days short of a year. 
After the 1989 election Conservative Jan P. Syse formed a coalition government but little more than 
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a year later had to resign and let previous Prime Minister, the Social Democrat Gro Harlem 
Brundtland form her third government.  
 The ministerial turnover outside of elections and collective resignation of the entire 
government is at the same level as in Denmark. Government serving for a short period of time, like 
that of John Lyng, produces ministers with equal short seniority, although as the government 
resigned as one it does not count as ministerial turnover as such, neither does the person with the 
shortest ministerial tenure, Astrid Heiberg, who only managed three weeks in 1986 before Kaare 
Willoch’s government fell. Ministerial turnover can have several reasons, this wish for new blood is 
one, but also ill-health and scandal can play a role. The latter happened when Terje Rød-Larsen left 
government less than three weeks after being appointed after questions were asked about his 
private financial dealings in relation to a government funded project he had previously been 
involved with. Likewise forced to resign was Manuela Ramin-Osmundsen in 1998 just four months 
after taking office as Minister for Children and Equality due to accusations of her appointing a close 
personal friends as Ombudsman for Children instead of renewing the tenure of the incumbent. 
Health reasons saw the leader of the Centre Party Åslaug Hauga resign in June 2008 after a 
prolonged media critique concerning violations against the building code at her home. Though these 
examples are in the minority, ministerial turnover in Norway appears primarily to be used for party 
political reasons, and it is far from all ministers who end up with a short tenure, though the frequent 
change over between centre-right coalitions and Social Democratic single-party governments in the 
1970s and 1980s naturally meant short tenures were not unusual, but ministers mostly went when 
the entire government went. Contrary, the longest serving ministers in Norway it has turned out to 
be mostly those who end up a Prime Ministers, of the five with most seniority post-1945 it is only 
Halvard Lange who did not become Prime Minister, but served as Foreign Minister for nearly twenty 
years (1946-1965) only interrupted by John Lyng’s short-lived government in 1963. 
 
Iceland 
The Icelandic President is the person who, after taking advice from the party leaders, decides who 
will be given the chance to form a government. This would normally fall to the leader of the largest 
party who can command support for his or her premiership. There is no vote of investiture to pass 
for a new government, and a loss on a parliamentary vote is not equal to a loss of confidence in the 
government. This negative parliamentarism is usually seen as conductive for the formation of 




Icelandic governments are alongside Finland outliers in the Scandinavian context with the 
frequency of majority coalition, and it is coalition formation appears much more competitive than its 
Scandinavian partners not least due the clientelistic roots of Icelandic politics (Indridason, 2005: 
439). The roots of Icelandic clientelism can be traced to two main issues. First, the formation of 
Icelandic parties, which despite its legislative home rule from 1874 did not get executive home rule 
until 1904.2 Second, the lack of an effective and strong bureaucracy meant that the parties were not 
held in check and could each develop their strong clientelism towards specific groups (see also 
Kristinsson, 2001; Kristjansson and Indridason, 2011). 
Iceland has seen no minority government and no single-party government since the 1979 
Social Democratic government led by Benedikt Gröndal, which only lasted little over three months. 
Indeed, Iceland has only seen four single-party governments since 1945 none of which have survived 
in office much longer than six months. All of the coalitions have involved at least one of the three 
major parties; the Social Democrats, the Conservatives, and the Progressive Party, with the latter 
two forming the more obvious coalition. Coalitions of all three major parties used to be normal, but 
was last seen in the government led by Thorsteinn Palsson from 1987-1988. 
The Icelandic Prime Minister has the right to call early elections, and this has been used in 
about half of the Icelandic cabinets for various reasons, for instance it was used in 1974 by the then 
Prime Minister Olafur Johannesson to avoid a vote of no confidence. Despite the possibility of calling 
early elections there has been quite some turnover of cabinets without elections. In one instance 
this was due to ill-health of the Prime Minister, Olafur Thors, who left office for Bjarni Benediktsson 
in 1963, but the coalition stayed the same. This was also the case when Bjarni Benediktsson passed 
away in 1970 while Prime Minister and was succeeded by Johann Hafstein with the same coalitional 
makeup. Yet cabinet turnover between elections also happens for policy reasons. In 2009 heavy 
protests broke out in Iceland in relation to the financial crisis which hit the country hard, then Prime 
Minister Geir Haarde called an early election and announced he was stepping down after the 
election due to suffering from cancer. However, long before the elections could be held Geir Haarde 
was forced to resign and turned the premiership over to Social Democrat Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir, the 
first female Icelandic Prime Minister, who also formed the government after the 2009 general 
election was held.3  
                                                          
2 From 1917-1944 Iceland was the Kingdom of Iceland under an act of union with the Kingdom of 
Denmark and declared its independence from Denmark in 1944. 
3 Geir Haarde was later indicted for negligence in relation to the financial crisis on Icleand and 
convicted on one count but would face no penalty.  
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Generally Icelandic cabinets appear to have been relatively sheltered from between 
elections turnover due to scandals. Nevertheless, a few situations which led to ministerial turnover 
have happened. Notably, Albert Guðmundsson, the first Icelandic professional football player, who 
had to resign as Minister of Industry in 1987 due to a tax scandal, and Björgvin G. Sigurðsson who 
stepped as Minister for Business Affairs in 2009 taking responsibility for how the financial crisis 
impacted Iceland. Most recently Hanna Birna Kristjánsdóttir had to step down in 2014 as Minister of 
Interior after serving about 18 months due her attempt to interfere with a police investigation of a 
leak stemming from her office. While these are just some examples, there is very little turnover 
within cabinets. The earlier Icelandic cabinets were very small and when they functioned for a very 
short time it rarely meant that turnover in form of reshuffles took place. With the somewhat more 
stable governments from the mid-1990s onwards there have been more reshuffles, not least due to 
the usual reason of getting new blood into the government.  
 
Comparing the Scandinavian Countries 
Depending on what the goal is, a comparative study including all five of the countries covered in this 
chapter might provide some issues. All five countries form their government under negative 
parliamentarism with the involvement of a Head of State, or similar person, to select who forms the 
government. However, the outcome in terms of government type varies considerably. 
 Finland is an outlier due to its frequent oversized majority coalition governments and 
Iceland can similarly be viewed as an outlier due to its frequent majority coalitions. Denmark has 
only very infrequently seen majority governments and has gotten used to minority coalitions, 
although the latest general election in 2015 returned a single-party minority government with the 
least parliamentary support of a government since 1973. Sweden also has many minority 
governments although single-party ones, mostly formed by the Social Democrats, have been a 
frequent occurrence in the past. Indeed, it was not before the 2014 election in Sweden that the 
Social Democrats went into a coalition government. Very knowledgeable researchers almost spelled 
the end of coalition governments in Norway around 2000, their demise might have been predicted a 
tad too early as all cabinets in Norway since 2001 have been of the coalition type. Table 1 presents 
an overview of the cabinet types of the Scandinavian countries. 
 
Table 1: Majority Status of Scandinavian Governments 1945-2015 
 Majority Minority 
 Single-party Coalition Single-party Coalition 
Denmark 0 4 11 17 
Norway 4 6 9 6 
13 
 
Sweden 2 6 15 3 
Finland 0 30 3 5 
Iceland 0 29 4 0 
Note: From Narud and Strom (2000), Bergman (2000), Damgaard (2000), Nousiainen (2000), 
Karvonen (2014), Indridason (2005) and updated by the author. 
 
In Table 2 an overview of the broad reasons for cabinet termination in the five Scandinavian 
countries is presented. It is possible to identify two broad types of termination and hence turnover, 
electoral and non-electoral. Electoral termination requires either a regular or an early election. Non-
electoral termination is either due to the resignation or death of the Prime Minister, a change in the 
partisan composition of the cabinet or a defeat in parliament not resulting in an early election. 
Danish governments are by far terminated by early elections, which might stem from defeats in 
parliaments. While it is de jure possible in Sweden to call early elections it is de facto not the case, in 
Norway it is not possible under any circumstances to call early elections. Finnish governments are 
just as often terminated due to changes in the cabinet composition as for other constitutional 
reasons. Whereas Icelandic cabinets stand an equal chance of being terminated early and serve the 
full electoral period of four years. 
 















Denmark 6 4 2 21 3 10 
Norway 17 6 0 0 1 4 
Sweden 20 2 2 1 1 0 
Finland 15 8 0 4 8 3 
Iceland 12 2 1 12 3 1 
Note: From Narud and Strom (2000), Bergman (2000), Damgaard (2000), Nousiainen (2000), 
Karvonen (2014), Indridason (2005) and updated by the author. 
 
It is more difficult to present a comparative view of ministerial turnover in the five 
Scandinavian countries. Lack of research on Finland and Iceland means that the findings that can be 
presented are based on Sweden, Denmark and Norway (see Hansen et al, 2013) which finds only 
limited support for the hypothesis of Huber and Martinez-Gallardo (2008) that coalition 
governments experience fewer turnovers than single-party governments. Regardless of whether the 
studies of ministerial turnover were to be expanded to Finland and Iceland, it does not include focus 
on the intricacies of why ministers turnover, i.e. the extent to which it is a resignation by a minister 
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or whether the minister was actually fired. Some examples have been put forward in this chapter of 
situations that lead to turnover, but mostly this is in relation to scandals. More difficult is the type of 
turnover that appear to have no particular background, but where a thorough examination of the 
party situation and the parliamentary spoils given or not given to previous ministers might yield 
more information than what we currently know. 
 Scandinavian cabinets are all governed by negative parliamentarism, yet there are 
differences in terms of early termination, but also in the usage of oversized coalitions and stable 
coalition patterns that makes the five countries discussed in this chapter alike in some aspects and 
different in others. The traditional comparisons of the Scandinavian systems tend to focus on 
Sweden, Norway and Denmark with Finland and Iceland often not included. From the discussions 
presented here this is perhaps not surprising. The most notable difference being the very strong 
presence of majority coalition governments in the two countries where minority governments are 
more prevalent in the three countries traditionally compared. In this respect there are still many 
questions that remain unanswered when it comes to cabinet and ministerial turnover in the 
Scandinavian countries, for instance are majority coalitions more stable when it comes to ministerial 
turnover, or is the stability circumvented by frequent changes in coalition partnerships?  But also 
questions like the reason for ministerial turnover that cannot be strictly attributed to scandal. 
Hansen et al (2013) presented one view on this topic where the connection between portfolio 
saliency and government popularity was explored, but did not examine in detail the particular 
reasons for changeover. For comparisons the differences between the Finnish and Icelandic systems 
on the one hand and the Swedish, Norwegian and Danish systems on the other hand must be 
considered. Yet, also the large differences between the relative instability in Finland before the early 
1980s should be taken into consideration in a cross-temporal comparison as it might not be entirely 
correct to view the case as similar across time. This also suggests that while a most-similar systems 
design is obvious for comparison of the Scandinavian countries there are minor differences that 
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